During the 2008-2009 crisis, trade in goods fell by almost 30%. In contrast, trade in business, telecommunication and financial services continued growing at their pre-crisis rates and only services related to transport declined. Using trade data at the firm-product-destination level for Belgium, I show that during the crisis the elasticity of services exports with respect to GDP growth in destination countries was significantly different from that of goods exports. In particular, the negative income shock in partner countries affected exports of goods but not exports of services. This difference is economically sizable: if goods exports had had the same elasticity to GDP growth as services exports, their fall during the 2008-2009 collapse would have been only half what was observed.
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Introduction
Between the third quarter of 2008 and the second quarter of 2009, trade in goods experienced the steepest decline ever recorded, with both exports and imports dropping four times more than income (Freund, 2009; Levchenko et al., 2010) . The fall was severe, highly synchronized across countries and mostly concentrated in the category of durable goods (Baldwin, 2009) . During this period, trade in services remained stable. Business, telecommunication and financial services, which constitute more than half of trade in services in modern economies, continued growing at their pre-crisis rates and only the category of transport services declined. This di↵erent reaction is hard to explain based on the existing literature. Most of the studies analyzing trade in services at the micro level suggest that trade in services shares many of the characteristics of trade in goods without any noticeable di↵erence. The empirical analysis proceeds in three steps. In the first, I provide descriptive evidence on how exporters reacted to the crisis. I decompose over-time changes in exports, separately for goods and services, into changes in the extensive and intensive margins. The paper is organized as follows: Section 2 describes the data; Section 3 presents the descriptive statistics; Section 4 presents the di↵erence-in-di↵erence analysis; Section 5 develops the triple-di↵erence approach; and Section 6 concludes.
Data Description
The bulk of the data used in this paper is composed of three di↵erent datasets provided by the National Bank of Belgium (NBB) concerning trade in services, trade in goods and firm-level accounts.
Data on trade in services come from the NBB Trade in Services dataset used to compile the balance of payments and cover the period from 2006 to 2010. The dataset is formed using di↵erent surveys conducted by the NBB 9 and contains information about trade in services at the firm-destination-product level. For any firm present in the dataset is available monthly or quarterly information (depending on the survey) on export values per type of product and destination country. Service products are listed in Table 2 of the Online Appendix and countries are classified using ISO 2-digit codes. 10 I exclude "services to a liates" (code H7000) from the analysis because this category does not contain information on which specific service is traded and "goods included in the construction services" (code E0002) because it does not strictly represent trade in services. After these cuts the dataset captures more or less 60% of total services exports by Belgium and about 40% of Belgian exporters. It is structured to be representative of all firms exporting services in terms of export size, exported services, firm size and geographical dispersion of exports. The survey nature of the dataset rules out any analysis of entry and exit patterns in foreign mar-
kets.
11 Therefore, the analysis in this paper will focus solely on the firms that are continuously observed during the period of analysis. 12 This means that I cannot analyze across-firm adjustments, but I can still explore the service and product margins, and thus within-firm adjustments during the crisis. This limitation should not too serious, since entry and exit account for less than 8% of total exports for both goods and services in normal years (Ariu, 2015) and since 9 For more information on the surveys, see 11 One problem is represented by the fact that the firms might be exporting before they get into the data. Another one relates to the fact that when a firm enters the dataset, it is kept for some years even if it does not meet the thresholds to be included any longer. Moreover, even by excluding those firms by checking the conformity with the criteria, it would give an idea of the entry into and exit from the survey, but it is questionable whether this would also be representative of entry into and exit from export markets. 12 These continuing firms account for about 96% of exports and imports present in the surveys, so we can be confident that the data covers the bulk of Belgian trade. In the rest of the paper, the analysis will be focused only on the first six 16 Data come from the OECD database available at http://stats.oecd.org 
Since I focus only on continuing firms, the change in the number of firms, f , is equal to one. Looking at are both generated almost entirely by a reduction in the quantities exported per market and product that is only partially counterbalanced (at least for services) by an increase in the average number of products. Both for goods and services trade, Belgian firms did not significantly leave destination markets: they decreased by only -0.33% for services and -1.41% for goods. They stepped up the average number of products provided per destination country: an increase 17 Some firms declare exports only quarterly and most firms export only once per year; therefore, carrying out an analysis on continuing firms at the monthly or quarterly level would reduce substantially the number of observations. by 2% for services and 1.83% for goods.
18 They cut their average exports per market-product significantly with a decline of -4.72% for services and a drop of -27.09% for goods. The huge di↵erence in the reaction of the average quantities exported per market and product suggests that the intensive margin is the key to understanding the di↵erence in the reactions of services and goods trade.
By dividing Belgian exports into the di↵erent product categories, a great heterogeneity across products, both for services and goods, appears in panel a of To discern di↵erences across firms, in panel c of Table 2 I divide exports following their multinational and foreign ownership status. For services, nonmultinational and non foreign-owned firms were hit by the crisis, while multinational and foreign-owned firms registered positive figures. However, these decreases are much smaller than those for goods, for which there is no heterogeneity following the multinational and foreign ownership status. Finally, we define in panel d a firm as big if its full-time equivalent employment is higher than the median exporter in the same industry, and as financially exposed if its external financial dependency is higher than the median exporter in the same industry. Based on this distinction, we observe that there is no heterogeneity for firms exporting goods, while small firms exporting services su↵ered more from the crisis than big ones. This result is partially driven by the fact that the only service category that experienced a drop, transport services, includes many small firms. In general, these results highlight a more pronounced heterogeneous response of services during the crisis.
Summing up the descriptive evidence on the crisis in Belgium, it seems that services exports did not su↵er as much as goods exports. Most of the adjustment was due to a decrease in the intensive margin which was more important for goods than for services. By contrast, the role of the extensive margin was less important, with both service and goods exporters reducing the number of destinations slightly and increasing the number of products per destination. In the case of goods, the fall was evenly spread geographically, while for services only non-OECD exports su↵ered. Moreover, we observe an important heterogeneity when looking at the di↵erent product types. In particular, transport services dropped similarly to trade in goods, while professional, financial and telecommunication services continued to grow at a rapid pace. For trade in goods, the decrease was mostly due to a reduction in durable and capital goods, while consumable goods declined more smoothly. Finally, heterogeneity played a role depending on ownership and multinational status, size, and financial situation for services exports, but not for goods exports.
Regression Analysis
To understand which factors could lead to a di↵erent response for services, I
use a di↵erence-in-di↵erence approach similar to Behrens et al. 
In this specification, and that may lead to a di↵erent reaction of service trade to the same shock. To capture this heterogeneity, I use the multinational and foreign-ownership status, the productivity and the size of the firm. These variables should shed some light on the role that firm characteristics played for services and goods exports. Table 3 provides a detailed explanation of the construction and the sources of all the variables used.
In order to avoid issues related to multicollinearity that might arise from the use of many firm-level variables together, I perform a principal component Column (1) of Table 4 shows the results for goods exports. Both the heterogeneity and GDP growth variables show significant coe cients for both the normal period ( 1 ) and the crisis period ( 2 ), while the global value chain and the financial constraints do not. The positive coe cient of 1 and the negative one of 2 for the heterogeneity covariate mean that bigger, more productive, foreign-owned or multinational firms are those, in terms of export growth, which tend to grow the most during normal times and su↵ered the least during the crisis. Looking at the income variation, the growth of goods exports follows GDP growth in destination countries in normal times: a one percent increase 20 The results for the specification with the firm-level variables not condensed in the principal component analysis is available in Table 3 of the Online Appendix. 21 Please note that in order to have a similar level of disaggregation between services and goods, I use the HS classification at the 2-digit level. 22 The procedure involves the computation of the standard errors clustered at each level of aggregation (in our case firm, country, product, firm-country, firm-product and countryproduct). These one-way clustered variance matrices are combined together and to the resulting matrix is subtracted the variance matrix that clusters all the dimensions together (firm-country-product in our case). in GDP growth is associated with a 1.2% increase in exports. This e↵ect is magnified during crises: a one percent decrease in GDP growth is associated with a 2.68% decrease in export values.
23
The insignificant coe cients for the global value chains and the financial constraints covariates suggest that they did not play a significant role during the crisis. However, it is also possible that the heterogeneity principal component is capturing part of that variation. For instance, it is known that multinationals can compensate for financial market imperfections (Manova et al., 2015) .
Therefore, the multinational status might capture part of the financial constraint variation. At the same time, while I use standard measures suggested by the literature, 24 the debate on which variable should be used to capture credit
constraints is still open. The main issue is that these variables might capture both demand and supply components, thus raising potential endogeneity concerns.
Switching to column (2) of Table 4 The results in Table 4 seem to be in line with this hypothesis: income variations in destination countries had little e↵ect on services exports, while they had a magnified e↵ect on trade in goods during the crisis. In order to test this hypothesis more finely, I proceed in two steps. In the first, I divide total exports into durable and consumable exports and check what e↵ect GDP growth has on 25 Please note that this result does not preclude the levels of services exports to be significantly correlated with the levels of GDP in destination countries, for example, in a gravity
setting. Moreover, I tested for the presence of second-and third-order non-linearities and I did not find any significant result. them. Here, GDP growth should have a stronger e↵ect on durable and capital goods than on consumable goods. In the second step, I use a measure of domestic absorption by product or service type. 26 If the compositional argument is valid, the exports of durables, consumables and services should be correlated with their corresponding absorption in the destination countries 27 during normal time, but no abnormal reaction during the crisis should be observed. In this case, the decrease in the demand for durables would explain the abnormal fall in goods exports during the crisis and the stability of service absorption would explain the spectacular resilience of trade in services.
Columns (3) and (4) of Table 4 present the results when splitting the sample 26 See Table 3 for the definition and the source of this variable. Please note that one limitation of this analysis is that I only have the information on the domestic absorption by product type for OECD destinations. 27 I.e. the exports of durable goods should be correlated with spending on durables in destination countries.
into the exports of durable and consumable goods. Most of the over-reaction of goods trade with respect to GDP variations is clearly due to the fall of durable goods, while consumable goods did not have any abnormal reaction during the crisis. This is a first clue that the compositional e↵ect is in place. In columns (1) and (2) of Table 5 , I run the same regression as in columns (1) and (2) of Table   4 using the growth in overall domestic absorption instead of the GDP growth.
This is a test to check whether the behavior of domestic spending mimics that of GDP growth. The results confirm the over-reaction of trade in goods during the crisis and thus the validity of domestic absorption as a proxy for income changes, despite its limited geographical coverage. 28 Finally, in columns (3), (4) and (5) of Table 5 , the export in durables, consumables and services are related to their respective domestic absorption. As expected, none of them is significantly correlated with their corresponding change in domestic absorption during the crisis ( 2 is never significant). Therefore, the compositional argument explains both the service resilience and the over-reaction of trade in goods: the demand for durables -which represent most of the export values -collapsed during the crisis, while that of services and consumables -which constitute most of the domestic income -stayed relatively high. Accordingly, while trade in goods collapsed, trade in services remained relatively stable.
Investigating Mechanisms
The previous section highlighted the di↵erent impact that GDP growth had on services and goods during the crisis. In this section, I test its significance and quantify the economic magnitude. To do so, services exports must be compared with goods exports and thus service exporters with goods exporters. I follow two complementary strategies. In the first one, I consider only firms that export both services and goods, or "bi-exporters". In the second one, I focus solely on 28 Please note that now trade in services is positively correlated with variations in domestic absorption, highlighting the fact that this covariate might be more appropriate for proxying service demand in destination countries during normal times.
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firms that export only services or goods, or "mono-exporters", and for every service exporter I find the closest goods exporter by applying propensity score matching. 29 The advantage of using the first method is that it is like performing a "perfect matching" and so, any di↵erence across goods and services related to both the observable and unobservable components of supply can be ruled out. The advantage of the second one is that the results are not influenced by interactions across goods and services within the same firm. Moreover, the first can provide evidence on the within-firm e↵ects of GDP growth in destination countries and the second complements by providing the across-firm perspective.
With respect to the previous analysis, I have to drop the product dimension since one cannot determine which good should be matched with a particular service and vice-versa. Therefore, the unit of analysis is represented by the change in exports of firm f in country c at time t, X fct . The interaction between a dummy indicating the service flow S f , the treatment dummy for the crisis T t and GDP growth will provide evidence on the di↵erential impact of the income shock on services exports with respect to goods exports during the crisis. This triple-di↵erence strategy can be expressed analytically as: Table 6 (panel a), the reaction of services exports to the income shock was significantly di↵erent from that of goods exports. In particular, to a one percent decline in GDP growth, services exports decrease on average 5.5% less than goods exports. By using the "matched" mono-exporters, and performing the same analysis, the results are the same qualitatively and are also very similar in quantitative terms (first column of Table 6 , panel b).
Therefore, the di↵erent reaction of services holds both within and across firms and it is not influenced by the fact that bi-exporters might represent a particular category of exporters. In the descriptive part of the paper, we observed that most of the decline in the exports of goods was accounted for by durable and capital goods. At the same time, while transport services were collapsing as much as goods, financial, telecommunication and business services did not su↵er at all during the crisis.
To check whether the same patterns can be observed in a regression setting and to refine the results, I divide the exports of goods and services into the di↵erent product categories and I apply the same type of analysis for each of them. I divide goods exports into exports of durable goods and exports of consumable goods. The results in columns (2) and (3) of Table 6 indicate that the resilience of services is significant only with respect to durable goods. In columns (4)-(10) of Table 6 , the regressions are carried out across di↵erent service categories. As can be seen from the magnitude and significance of the coe cients, most of the e↵ect is accounted for by business services. 30 Therefore, services look more similar to consumables than to durable goods and services like management, legal, accounting and marketing continued to be purchased despite the negative economic situation. This evidence reinforces the argument that services represent non-discretionary components of the production process and their continuous sourcing is vital for the production of final products (Johnson, 2014) . Column (9) shows that the same e↵ect is not present for financial services, which is the category that experienced the biggest increase in trade in services during the crisis. Two facts can explain this result. First, the financial sector is highly concentrated, with few firms driving aggregate figures. Thus, even if few financial firms enjoyed higher exports during the crisis, the data tell us that many others were su↵ering. Second, trade in goods collapsed less for firms which also exported financial services. Therefore, there might not be enough variation to capture the same e↵ect for bi-exporters of financial services. Finally, when distinguishing between OECD and non-OECD exports in columns (11)-(12) of Table 6 , the service resilience seems to be driven by OECD destination markets only. This result should be interpreted carefully because most Belgian exports go to OECD countries (about 70%) and most of the trade in services outside the OECD is represented by transport services. Again, the variation might not be enough to identify the same e↵ect also in non-OECD export markets.
Robustness Checks and Further Results
To check the robustness of the results, I perform the same analysis as in Table   6 using the measure of domestic absorption in destination countries instead of GDP growth. Even if the sample size is reduced to OECD countries only, all the results are confirmed: in Table 7 the domestic absorption variable is negative and significant for the whole sample (column 1), for durable goods (column 2) and for business services (column 4). 31 Moreover, even the magnitudes are comparable to those of Table 6 . Therefore, even using a di↵erent variable to proxy income the variation in destination countries, results remain the same.
Using a similar empirical strategy, it is possible to check whether credit constraints played a di↵erent role for services with respect to goods during the crisis. Analytically, the empirical specification is very similar to (3):
where F in f denotes the principal component variable for credit constraints.
The only di↵erences are that standard errors are clustered at the firm level and country-year dummies are used to control for demand shocks in partner countries. Table 8 shows the results for credit constraints. In most specifications, 0 3 is not significant, so, there is no strong evidence supporting a di↵erent role of credit constraints for services exports relative to goods exports during the crisis. This result holds both for bi-exporters and mono-exporters, di↵er-entiating goods and services into their di↵erent categories and interacting the 31 The only exception is in the category of consumable goods for which the coe cient is significant for mono-exporters. financial constraint variable with the GDP growth variable. Moreover, it holds even when splitting the principal component into the di↵erent variables composing it. Thus, to the extent that the variables used are able to capture the credit constraints faced by exporters, they did not play a significant part to explain the di↵erent reaction of services exports. Finally, it is also possible to test whether firm-characteristics and global value chains had di↵erential effects for services with respect to goods exports using the same strategy used for credit constraints. The results reported in Tables 5 and 6 of the online appendix suggest that there is no significant e↵ect both looking at bi-exporters and mono-exporters. Therefore, supply-side factors such as credit constraints, global value chains or heterogeneity were not central forces to explain the resilience of services.
Conclusions
This paper shows that exports of services did not su↵er from the 2008-2009 crisis because they are more immune to short-term negative income shocks than goods exports. Using exports at the firm-product-destination level for Belgium, I find that the elasticity of services with respect to GDP growth in destination countries during the crisis was significantly di↵erent from that of goods. In 
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